In contrast to single-product pricing models, multi-product pricing models have been much less studied because of the complexity of multi-product demand functions. It is highly nontrivial to construct a multi-product demand function on the entire set of nonnegative prices, not to mention approximating the real market demands to a desirable accuracy. Thus, many decision-makers use incomplete demand functions which are defined only on a restricted domain, e.g. the set where all components of demand functions are nonnegative. In the first part of this paper, we demonstrate the necessity of defining demand functions on the entire set of nonnegative prices, through some examples. Indeed, these examples show that incomplete demand functions may lead to inferior pricing models. Then we formulate a type of demand functions using a Nonlinear Complementarity Problem (NCP). We will show that such demand functions possess certain desirable properties, such as monotonicity. In the second part of the paper, we consider an oligopolistic market, where producers/sellers are playing a non-cooperative game to determine the prices of their products. When the model of demand functions is incorporated into the best response problem of each producer/seller involved, it leads to a complementarity constrained pricing problem facing each producer/seller. Some basic properties of the pricing models are presented. In particular, we show that, under certain conditions, the complementarity constraints in this pricing model can be eliminated, which tremendously simplifies the computation and theoretical analysis. 
Introduction
Pricing is a significant tool used in the profit maximization of firms. In the past decades, extensive research has been conducted to produce many different pricing strategies. These include dynamic and fixed strategies (i.e., the price is fixed over time), single and multiperiod strategies, single and multiple product strategies, and so on. These strategies play an important part in retail and manufacturing industries, revenue and supply chain management etc, cf. Bernstein and Federgruen (2003) , Bernstein and Federgruen (2004B) , Bernstein and Federgruen (2005) , Besanko, Gupta and Jain (1998) , Eliashberg and Steinberg (1991) , Federgruen and Meissner (2004) , Gilbert (2000) , Giraud-Heraud, Hammoudi and Mokrane (2003) , Lederer and Li (1997) , Perakis and Sood (2004) , Reibstein and Gatignon (1984) , Tanaka (2001) , Weatherford (1997) , and the many references discussed in Bitran and Caldentey (2003) .
However, in contrast to single-product pricing models, multi-product pricing models have been much less studied, cf. Bitran and Caldentey (2003) . As more firms entered the markets, and due to the heterogeneous tastes of consumers, it became necessary to incorporate product differentiation and competition into pricing models. In these competitive and multi-product pricing models, the demand-price relationships (or demand functions) of multiple products are among the core ingredients. As products are commonly substitutable for or complementary to one another, the demand for each product should depend on the prices of all products in the same market.
In Figure 1 below, we illustrate the general demand functions for a market of 2 mutually substitutable products. Here we depict the demand function for product i (i = 1, 2) as D i (p 1 , p 2 ). (Note that though each function D i should be defined for all (p 1 , p 2 ) ≥ 0, the figure only shows the portion (p 1 , p 2 ) ∈ [0, 10] × [0, 10] . Note also that the origin (p 1 , p 2 , D i ) = (0, 0, 0) is the corner hidden by the surface of the demand function). From the graph, we can see the typical shape of demand functions. Observe the graph of D 1 for example. As p 1 increases, D 1 decreases until, when p 1 is sufficiently large (≥ 6), the demand D 1 becomes close to zero or it completely vanishes. For a fixed p 1 (for example p 1 = 2), as p 2 increases, D 1 increases until a certain point (about where p 2 = 6) and then it stays almost constant after that. An important phenomenon is that demands are sensitive to prices within a certain region, and much less sensitive to prices outside it. This can be observed from the quadrilaterals on the surface of the demand function: the quadrilaterals are irregular for (p 1 , p 2 ) in the region [0, 6]×[0, 6] (we refer to it as the main area), and regular (being rectangles) outside this region. Thus, a demand function must approximate demands accurately on the main area and can be relatively simple outside the main area.
Most demand functions, for example, the commonly used linear demand functions, are difficult to be defined on R N + , the set of all nonnegative prices, because they inevitably become negative when prices are high. To be more specific, let us consider the linear demand system of the form d(p) = b − Ap, where d and p are the demand and price vectors respectively, b is a constant vector and A is a matrix of appropriate dimensions. By the law of demand, i.e., the demand d i decreases in its own price p i , the demand function d i will be negative for a large value of p i . Thus, the linear demand function d is meaningful (nonnegative) only on Ω, defined as the set of nonnegative prices at which all components of d(p) are nonnegative. As it requires a proper reconfiguration to define demand reasonably outside Ω so as to define a complete function on R N + , the resulting pricing models will become much more involved.
To the best of our knowledge, all existing multi-product pricing models using linear demand functions restrict prices (as variables) on Ω, explicitly or implicitly, except for Boyer and Moreaux (1987) , Kübler and Müller (2002) . However, as we will explain in section 2.2, these latter models have certain undesirable properties.
Thus, it is of great interest to investigate the following question: are all p / ∈ Ω really redundant? We wish to argue that an extension of the domain of the demand function is necessary in the sense that, in some applications, failing to do so will lead to erroneous conclusions. Indeed, a simple pricing example is provided in the next section where the maximum revenue of a seller can be obtained at prices outside Ω. And an example in section 3 shows that an equilibrium for a pricing game restricted on Ω fails to be a true equilibrium for the pricing game defined on the entire set of nonnegative prices.
Since prices outside Ω are necessary, the problem one faces now is how to define the demand D in a simple and compelling way. Because demands are generally highly sensitive to prices in one main area and considerably less sensitive to prices in other areas, a practically effective way to construct a demand function is first to approximate demands on a main area Ω ⊂ R N + accurately by a function, say d, and then to extend it to the whole R ∈ Ω (i.e., if d(p) < 0), because the product's demand depends only on its own price. But for the case of multiple products, it is much more difficult as the demands at all prices outside Ω need not vanish. Such a phenomenon can be observed from Figure 1 . For instance, in the region [6, 10] × [0, 6] , D 1 is approximately zero, but D 2 = 0.
In this paper, a clear and efficient scheme is used for this purpose. The basic idea is this: for a given d : R N + → R N which is nonnegative on Ω, first, we define a map B that maps any price vector in Ω to itself, and any price vector outside Ω to the boundary of Ω; then, we define D(p) = d (B(p) ) for all p. Our way to define B is via a nonlinear complementarity problem (NCP). That is, given any input price vector p for the NCP, the solution will be the mapped price B(p). We will explain the rationality of this demand function in next section.
The above proposed demand function leads us naturally to a new pricing model. Since in this model, the demand at each p is in fact evaluated at B(p), the complementarity constraints present in the NCP becomes part of the model's pricing constraints. Thus, the best response problem facing each seller is an NCP constrained optimization problem, or a Mathematical Program with Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC), as named in Luo, Pang and Ralph (1996) .
An interesting result is that, in some situations, the NCP constraints in this optimization problem can be eliminated to obtain a simplified model; the original model and the simplified model are, in a certain sense, equivalent. The simplification implicitly ensures that only p ∈ Ω needs to be considered. The computations and analysis are thus tremendously simplified. For example, the existence of a Nash Equilibrium (NE) for our pricing game can then be shown under some standard conditions. As a by-product, this equivalence provides a rigorous justification for the pricing models introduced in several papers where the demand function is confined to Ω. However, there are also situations in which the pricing models involve more complicated constraints and thus the aforementioned simplification cannot be realized. In such situations, the complementarity constraints inherited from the complementarity-based demand functions will remain as a core structure in pricing models.
In section 4 of our paper, we will discuss different types of demand functions and conduct a comparison of pricing models incorporating these functions. In practice, one usually uses elementary (closed form) functions to approximate demands. One way is to use a single elementary function to approximate demands for prices on the entire R N + . Some commonly used functions are (Logit)
p r j , with r < 0 and γ > 0, as mentioned in Milgrom and Roberts (1990) and Bernstein and Federgruen (2004A) . Though they seem simple, they may not reflect real market behavior. As mentioned above, demand usually differs in its sensitivity to prices over different areas. Thus it is a very difficult task to approximate demand over all areas well with a single-piece function. An accurate approximation in one area may result in poor approximations in other areas. For example, Cobb-Douglas and CES demand functions D i blow up at very low prices p i , and Cobb-Douglas function D i tends to infinity as any other price p j tends to infinity. Besides, in pricing models incorporating such functions, the existence of optimal solutions or Nash Equilibriums in games usually cannot be proved using standard results or fixed point theorems, as the functions are usually not concave (see figure 1) . Indeed, as far as we know, if we have a very simple (single product per seller) pricing game involving the above functions, where only interval constraints on the individual prices are allowed, NE existence is proven by showing that the game in concern is log-supermodular (see Milgrom and Roberts (1990) ). However, when each seller participating in a game offers multiple products, or the constraint sets involved are some common convex sets, which are not complete lattices or sublattices of R N , the game is unlikely to be of a supermodular form. That is, it is difficult to guarantee NE existence for such games.
Another approach is this: construct a piecewise smooth demand function that allows us to approximate the demand on each area of prices using a piece of the function. In contrast to single-piece functions, such multiple-piece functions can approximate demands on the whole R N + accurately. In particular, it allows one to choose the most suitable function d on the main area Ω which reflects real market behavior and possesses desirable properties, e.g. concavity or linearity, so as to ease the computation and analysis. But it is not easy to build a multiple-structured demand system, because it involves the determination of a large number (exponential in the dimension) of areas and functions. Our model, however, provides a tractable way to approximate the demand in the different areas via a simple complementarity problem. Even though the piecewise smooth demand function D is not concave on R N + and thus the best response problem in the pricing model is not convex, the NCP structure permits, under certain conditions, the set of optimal solutions of the best response problem to be convex. (The proof is not straightforward and will be presented in a separate paper). This property is very important for the existence and computation of equilibrium prices. Furthermore, as will be demonstrated later through Theorems 12 and 13, many NCP constrained best response problems can be reduced to essentially equivalent but tremendously simplified problems. Indeed, in the reduced model, we only need to consider a ' single-piece' function in Ω (usually a convex and compact set). Hence it is much simpler than a single-piece function defined on all nonnegative prices (like those described above). In this way, we establish both the accuracy and the simplicity of such pricing models. Not only do they become more computationally tractable, they also have great theoretical advantages as we basically require demand to be concave only on the restricted set of prices Ω, to ensure NE existence. Thus in such cases, our model is in some ways superior to the other models.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we further discuss the motivation behind our paper. Then we go on to formulate the model of the demand functions using an NCP, and consider some theoretical properties of the model. In Section 3, we will introduce a general complementarity constrained best response pricing problem, and discuss the conditions under which the game involving such best response problems can be reduced to a game involving simplified best response problems. An equilibrium existence result follows for the game. This is followed by a section discussing a general review of pricing models and further justifications of our study. In the final section, we propose some potential future research directions.
Demand functions
Suppose that in a market there are M sellers and seller i offers N i products, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , M }. In this paper, for simplicity, we assume that all the products offered are distinct. Indeed, in reality, the products offered by different sellers are rarely identical. Thus, there are altogether N 1 + . . . + N M = N distinct products in the market. We denote the price of product j as p j and the price vector of all other products as p −j , for each
Here and below, (x; y; z . . .) symbolizes a vector in which x stacks on y, y stacks on z and so on. All the vectors in this paper are column vectors. Because the products are substitutable for each other or complementary to each other, demand D j depends on the prices of all products, thus it is a function of p.
Essentially, we can call d a demand function in the sense that it characterizes (to a desirable accuracy) the sensitive part of the real demand (on the main area as we described in the introduction). However, d can be prescribed freely outside the main area, and thus can be assumed to be smooth everywhere. In short, d can be assumed to be simple and very smooth. In practice, it is usually an elementary function, or at least a function in closed form. In particular, if d is linear, then we write
The diagonal entry a jj of A is the decrement in demand for product j when the price p j increases by one unit, and the (j, k) entry a jk of A is the amount of demand shifting from product k to product j when the price p k increases by one unit. 1 This paper only considers nonnegative prices (negative prices do appear in the literature) for simplicity and focus. However, many results in the paper can be extended to incorporate negative prices, with mild modifications.
2 Implicitly, we assume that the demand for any product in the market only depends on the prices of products sold by the companies in this market, and does not depend on the price of any product sold by the companies outside this market. All other factors that may influence demand are assumed constant and represented by the constant term b or d(0).
It is reasonable to assume that
That is, when all the prices are zero, the demand for each product should be nonnegative and when the price of product j increases, the demand d j should decrease. In the case of linear d, this translates to b j ≥ 0 and a jj > 0 for all j = 1, . . . , N . But note that products can be substitutable for each other or complementary to each other unless it is specifically indicated, thus e.g., the non-diagonal entries a jk are not restricted.
Allowing for accuracy on the main area and simplicity and smoothness on R 
The definition of the nonnegative function D outside Ω requires much greater caution. We will discuss this in the next two subsections.
Before describing the demand function D, we shall first answer the following question, which is often raised, particularly in connection with applications.
Must demand functions be defined outside Ω?
Because demand functions are building bricks in many OR models, a rigorous and complete model of demand-price relationships is clearly important. Some people may argue that it suffices to consider only prices in Ω where all components of d(p) are nonnegative, because any price outside Ω will either create zero demand or be redundant. Although this argument is vague, it may seem acceptable from an applied perspective; and this is probably the reason why the linear demand functions commonly used in the existing literature are confined to the set Ω. Thus, it is worthwhile to provide strong evidence to settle this question.
Example 1 Consider a simple pricing problem involving a single seller offering 2 mutually substitutable products (e.g., business class and economy class air tickets). The demandprice relationships are given by d 1 (p) = 20 − 3p 1 + 2p 2 and d 2 (p) = 100 + p 1 − 4p 2 . For simplicity, we ignore the costs of production. Let q i represent the quantity of product i to be sold, where i = 1, 2. As it is clear that the quantity sold should be nonnegative and restricted by the amount demanded, we have the constraints 0
Suppose that the inventory level is 30, i.e., the total amount sold is restricted to be not more than 30. This translates to the constraint q 1 + q 2 ≤ 30. Due to differences in quality or attributes of the 2 products, the price of product 1 is restricted to be not less than that of product 2. This gives rise to the last constraint p 1 ≥ p 2 ≥ 0. The problem is then to decide on the prices to set (and the amount to sell) to maximize the seller's revenue q 1 p 1 + q 2 p 2 , given the demand, inventory and pricing constraints above.
Suppose we do not allow the consideration of prices p / ∈ Ω. Then the constraints p 1 ≥ p 2 and d 1 (p) ≥ 0 imply that
Thus, the maximum revenue that can be obtained is bounded from above by
However, if we consider the possibility of setting prices outside Ω, we can show that a higher revenue can be obtained. Now we denote by D(p), the demand function on R Choosing to sell 30 units of product 2 and none of product 1, i.e., q 1 = 0, q 2 = 30, it is easy to see that all constraints are met and the total revenue obtained is
This example shows clearly that at times, we do need to consider prices outside Ω to achieve higher profits.
The restriction of admissible price variables entails the loss of some percentage of profits (as shown above), for deterministic demands. However, for random demands, this restriction may make it entirely impossible to define a reasonable demand function, as shown below. A reasonable definition of the demand function is given by the two-piece function
In Section 3, we will present another example which involves a two-seller pricing game. That example shows: an equilibrium price obtained from a game where sellers are only allowed to set prices in Ω need not be an equilibrium price if prices outside Ω are allowed.
Having understood the necessity of a complete definition of the demand function on R N + , we are now faced with the problem of actually defining the demand function.
How to define demand functions outside Ω.
For the single-product case, the demand function of the form
is most natural and commonly used. We attempt to extend it to the multiple-product case.
Unlike the single-product case, for the multiple-product case the function d i can be negative or positive at a p ∈ Ω. It is natural to define
The following are possible and apparently natural ways to model demand outside Ω.
A possible model can be
However, forp ∈ ∂Ω (the boundary of Ω), we have d i (p) = 0 for some component i, but we may also have d j (p) > 0 for another component j. Since D j (p) = 0 for all p ∈ Ω, D so defined cannot be continuous, which is clearly undesirable.
To avoid the discontinuity, we can consider another model (as used in Boyer and Moreaux (1987) , Kübler and Müller (2002) ). For each j ∈ {1, . . . , N },
A consequence of this model is: if d j (p) = 0, then for any p with p j >p j (with other prices unchanged),
) may increase and tend to infinity as p j → ∞. That is, the demand for product i may increase to infinity when its own price p i is unchanged and some other price p j tends to infinity. This is very unlikely to be valid in the market. Now, what should a rational demand function satisfy?
Consider a market of two substitutable products with demands D 1 and D 2 and prices p 1 and p 2 . Fix p 1 =p 1 and increase p 2 . At the beginning, assuming that both D 1 and D 2 are positive, i.e. p = (p 1 , p 2 ) ∈ int(Ω) (the interior of Ω), the demand D 2 decreases as p 2 increases because some customers stop purchasing product 2. These customers may decide to buy product 1 instead, thus D 1 may increase. After p 2 is increased to a certain valuep 2 , the demand D 2 will drop to zero (assuming Ω is bounded). At this price, no customer purchases product 2 any more. Any further increase of p 2 should not affect the market because D 2 will remain at zero and D 1 will not increase any more, as no customer demand can shift from product 2 to product 1. Based on this observation, a
This property is formally stated below.
where e i is the i-th unit vector.
In the above illustration, we see thatp = (p 1 ,p 2 ) is on Ω (more precisely, on the boundary of Ω). For any p = (p 1 , p 2 ) outside Ω with p 2 >p 2 , we see that
. This observation suggests that we can first define a map B(p) =p and then define
We call B(p) the projected price of p. Such a map B can be defined via a complementarity problem as follows.
Definition 2 For any
where ⊥ stands for perpendicular and
Definition 2 is essentially equivalent to Problem 1 in Shubik and Levitan (1980, Appendix B) . We formulate it explicitly as an NCP (Nonlinear Complementarity Problem), so that the rich results available in the well-established area of NCPs can be utilized and applications of this demand function can be more easily investigated.
Throughout this paper we make the following assumption. There has been extensive research on the existence and uniqueness of solutions to complementarity problems, cf. Cottle, Pang and Stone (1992) or Facchinei and Pang (2003) . If d is linear, a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a unique solution to the LCP (Linear Complementarity Problem) is that A is a P-matrix (i.e., all the principal minors of A are positive). Thus in this paper, we assume that A is a P-matrix. 
any p ∈ R N + . These conditions also ensure that the map B is continuous and piecewise smooth provided d is smooth, cf. Facchinei and Pang (2003) . However, the conditions that can ensure B(p) ∈ Ω is less obvious. We will illustrate this property for the linear function d in Lemma 6.
Under Assumption 1, we can define a demand function.
Definition 3 The demand function
where the map B is as stated in Definition 2.
The nonnegativity of D follows directly from the facts that B(p) ∈ Ω (as assumed) and d is nonnegative on Ω. In addition, since d and B are continuous, the continuity of D is obvious.
In addition, this demand function is a unique extension of the function d, as shown below.
Theorem 4 Under Assumption 1, the function D as defined in Definition 3 is the unique regular demand function which agrees with d on Ω.
This theorem is a slight modification of Theorem 1 in Shubik and Levitan (1980, Appendix B) . Thus, the proof of Theorem 1 in the book is applicable here. Now let us discuss the conditions which can guarantee that the assumption B(p) ∈ Ω for any p ∈ R N + holds true. For the linear function d, we can present a necessary and sufficient condition. For nonlinear d, the conditions required are more intricate. Thus, we will illustrate this only for linear d. First we need the following result which shows when Ω is bounded.
Lemma 5 If d is linear and A is a P-matrix, then Ω is bounded.
Proof. If Ω is not bounded, then there exists a pointp ∈ Ω and a direction u ≥ 0, such that
This implies
Because A JJ is a P-matrix, by Theorem 3.3.4 (b) in Cottle, Pang and Stone (1992) , this implies u J = 0, which is a contradiction since by definition u J > 0.
For any index set K ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , N }, we always denote byK the complement of K, i.e.K = {1, 2, . . . , N } \ K.
Lemma 6 Let d be linear and A be a P-matrix. Then, B(p)
More precisely, under the above condition,
Proof. "⇐" Suppose condition (4) holds. We want to show that
Then by the complementarity conditions of LCP(p), we have pK − xK = 0. Since p ≥ 0, we have xK ≥ 0.
To show x K ≥ 0, we consider the polyhedron
Obviously, x ∈ H. Any vertex y of H is associated with an index set J such that J ⊇ K and
and shows that every vertex y of H is nonnegative. Since x = B(p) can be represented as a convex combination of the vertices of H, B(p)
Since p ≥p ≥ 0 and pK = 0, we havepK = 0.
It follows from
If d is linear and we are considering a system of N mutually substitutable products, then all the off-diagonal entries of A will be non-positive. If in addition, A is a P matrix, then A is an M-matrix. Thus the inverse of A and all its principal submatrices are nonnegative (see Berman and Plemmons (1994) ). It follows that with b ≥ 0, A −1 JJ b J ≥ 0 will always be satisfied for all J ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , N }. This special case was considered in Shubik and Levitan (1980) .
The map B has a simple geometric structure. To show this, we introduce some notations:
and the cone
Notice that C(p) = {p} forp in the interior of Ω because J(p) = ∅.
Lemma 7 Under Assumption 1,
under Assumption 1, B(p) ∈ Ω (see Lemma 6 for linear d). By the definition of B, p ≥ B(p) and pJ = B(p)J . This shows that p ∈ C(B(p)).
(ii) For anyp ∈ Ω and p ∈ C(p), we have p ≥p and
is a solution of NCP(p). Under Assumption 1, the solution of NCP(p) is unique, which is B(p). Thus,p = B(p).
Lemma 7 shows that for any p ∈ R N + , there exists a uniquep ∈ Ω such that p ∈ C(p).
In fact,p = B(p). This means that the map B(p) can be equivalently defined by the cone C(p).
We now have both algebraic characterization (by NCP) and geometric characterization (by the cones C(p)) of the map B.
Could other choices of the map B have been suitable to define the demand function? We investigated the following possibility: the familiar orthogonal map. However, we found that this map cannot be used. 
This means that with p 2 kept constant, an increase in p 1 leads to a decrease in demand for product 2. However, one would expect either an increase or no change in the demand for product 2; resulting from either a shift in demand from product 1 to product 2, or a decision to give up on buying. That is, it is not reasonable to have D j decreasing in p k , for k = j, if we are considering a market of mutually substitutable products. Therefore, the orthogonal map is not suitable for defining the demand function. Having clearly explained the demand model, we will now study some desirable and useful properties of the demand function.
Some properties of the demand function
The demand function defined in the preceding section possesses some properties which are desirable from the perspective of Economics and Management. In this paper, we will only investigate a fundamental property: monotonicity (it is called the law of demand in Economics). It is a desirable property in many applications of demand functions.
We will first investigate the change of demand of a product as its own price varies, then followed by the change of demand of all the products as all prices vary. Although the former is a special case of the latter, the former may be observed under weaker conditions. The result below is proven for the linear d case for simplicity.
Theorem 8 Let d be linear. If A is a P-matrix and the condition (4) is satisfied, then the demand function
Proof. Suppose that the price vector of all the products excluding product j, p −j , is fixed. So we can consider D j and B as functions of p j , and write D j (p j ) and B(p j ) instead. We first consider the interval
pK by complementarity, we have
Now we have
Since A is a P-matrix, both detA αα and detA KK are positive. Thus,
The above result is a very basic property that D should satisfy. However, we must also consider the case in which the prices of more than one product vary. A non-rigorous statement of the monotonicity of demand is that total demand for all the products should not increase for any increase in prices.
The difficulty of extending this monotonicity to multiple-product markets lies in that the space of R N is not totally ordered, i.e., not every pair of points can be ordered. For instance, we cannot tell which of (0, 1) and (1, 0) is larger.
We can express the monotonicity for a single product as
To extend this to the multiple-product market, we have
This monotonicity property of D is desirable in theoretical analysis and has been used as a condition in many research papers, see for example, Perakis and Sood (2004) .
We now show that the demand model D satisfies this property.
Theorem 9 Under Assumption 1, if d is monotonically decreasing on R
Now
where the third equality follows from the complementarity constraints (p − x ) Then it follows from the above theorem that D is monotonically decreasing.
This implies that
∀ p, p , (p − p) T (D(p ) − D(p)) ≤ (x − x) · (D(p ) − D(p)) = (x − x) · (d(x ) − d(x)) ≤ 0,
Pricing models
As competition intensifies, more products are offered in markets and their relationships become more complex. Thus good pricing models become core decision tools for corporations' revenue management. The goal of this section is to study a game-theoretic pricing model in which the demand functions proposed in the preceding section are used. The best response problem facing each seller is then an NCP constrained optimization problem. We will study under what conditions the NCP constrained problem can be reduced to a simplified problem, and then present an existence result for the pricing game.
Formulation of pricing models
A general pricing model in a (oligopolistic) market of M sellers can be described as follows. Given other sellers' prices fixed, seller i's best response pricing problem is solves his best response problem (see Nash (1950) ). In our case, each seller's strategy set (set of possible prices) depends on other sellers' strategies (prices), hence p * is called a Generalized Nash Equilibrium, in short GNE, (as discussed in Harker (1991) and Pang (2002) ).
In this paper, we propose a pricing model which incorporates the special structure of our demand function. In general, the profit function depends on price and demand. Since our demand is, in essence, a function of the projected price, namely,
we can write the objective function in terms of p and B(p). As we will explain later, it suffices to consider an objective function dependent only on the projected price vector x = B(p). Therefore, we propose the following general pricing model:
Notice that the function f i need only be defined on Ω because B(p) ∈ Ω for all p ∈ R N + . We will describe the function f i for some specific pricing models below.
Writing the complementarity structure explicitly, we are led to the following equivalent model:
Note that x and p are of N -dimension while x The model (9) is an NCP constrained optimization problem. Readers can refer to Luo, Pang and Ralph (1996) for general properties of such problems and methods to solve them.
We can consider a more general objective function f i (p, x) depending on both the price p and the projected price x. But it does not gain much generality, and Proposition 10 below shows that the model (9) is sufficiently general. Thus, we consider f i (x) to avoid involving additional conditions with regard to the dependence of f i on p.
A frequently employed pricing model is as follows. 
Proof. By Definition 3, the model (10) can be written as
For each j, if p j > x j , then by the complementary condition, d j (x) = 0, which implies q j = 0 and
holds true for any p ∈ R N + . Therefore, we can rewrite the objective function in the model (12) as
Defining f i as in (11), the model (12) can be formulated as (9).
It is easy to see that under very mild conditions the problem (9) is feasible and bounded. However, the set of optimal solutions of (9) can either be empty or have multiple solutions, because the feasible region need not be closed and convex. To illustrate this point, let us consider the simple case where d is linear and M = 1. For convenience, we omit the index for company. We denote
and rewrite the problem (9) as follows:
The set B(G) is the image of the set G ∩ R N + under the mapping B. Usually, such a set is nonconvex even if G is convex. Thus the above program is in general nonconvex. Moreover, B(G) need not be closed even if G is closed, thus although the above problem may be bounded, it may not achieve an optimal solution. Example 4 Figure 3 shows an example in which Ω and G are two-dimensional sets. Here B(G) consists of two line segments U 1 U 2 and U 2 U 3 , excluding the point U 3 . Thus, B(G) is neither convex nor closed. Figure 3 . B(G) is neither convex nor closed.
Note that even if the constraint
) is absent, the problem (9) is still nonconvex in general, as shown through the following example. In the above figure, we see that
Ω
Thus, at the pricesp,p andp, we have the objective values
, it is clear that the objective function of problem (13) is not concave, that is, problem (13) is nonconvex.
Simplification of pricing models
It is not easy to solve problem (9) because it involves NCP constraints. In what follows, we will discuss the cases in which some complementarity constraints can be eliminated and thus computations can be simplified.
For convenience, henceforth we will say that for any model (A), the game (A) is the game involving the best response model (A).
Theorem 11 Suppose that Assumption 1 holds and that, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , M }, the set
). Then the model (9) can be reduced to (9) given p
Thus, all the complementarity constraints in (14) are satisfied by (p i ,x) . In addition, given that the above hypothesis holds,p
is also a GNE of the game (9).
The above theorem allows us to reduce some complementarity constraints (in (9)) to simple inequality constrains (in (14)). This reduction can significantly simplify the computation and theoretical analysis. More evidences of this effect will be provided later.
The main condition warranting this reduction is "p
) for I i ⊆ N i ". Example 7 below will illustrate this condition and the consequent model reduction. In many pricing problems, the constraint p
) is absent. In this case, the aforementioned condition is satisfied trivially for I i = N i , and thus the reduction is warranted.
Since the extreme case I i = N i also holds in many other circumstances, i.e. for any
), we shall now pay special attention to this case. By Theorem 11, the model (9) can be reduced to
Surprisingly, the model can be much further simplified, as shown below in Theorem 12. In fact, we can reduce the model (9) to the model
in the sense that, if p * is a GNE of the game (15), p * is also a GNE of the game (9). (Sometimes we say that (15) is 'equivalent' to (9) .)
The equivalence of the problems (9) and (15) seems very unlikely, because the problem (9) is highly nonconvex due to the NCP constraints, while the problem (15) ) being a convex set. It is interesting that problems (9) and (15) can be proven to be equivalent.
Theorem 12 Suppose that Assumption 1 is satisfied and that
).
Then if p * is a GNE of the game (15), p * is also a GNE of the game (9).
Proof. Let p * be an equilibrium of (15). Then d 
, where p i * is the optimal solution. Therefore,
This shows that (p
) is an optimal solution of (9) given p
Therefore p * is an equilibrium of the game defined by the best response problem (9).
), e.g., for the f i defined in (11) (as discussed in the proof of Theorem 16). The condition d
, implies that seller i s products are substitutable for seller k s products. For the linear d case, this translates into A ik ≤ 0 ∀ i, k, k = i, where A ik denotes the submatrix of A consisting of rows corresponding to seller i s products and columns corresponding to seller k s products. However, note that the products sold by a seller can either be substitutes or complements for each other, because they are not restricted by the above condition.
As we mentioned earlier, if the constraint
) is trivially satisfied. In the papers Bernstein and Federgruen (2004A) , Dai, Chao, Fang and Nuttle (2004) , Gallego and Van Ryzin (1997) , Garcia-Gallego and Georgantzis (2001), Maglaras and Meissner (2003) , and Roy, Hanssens and Raju (1994) , either no additional constraints on p
Note that if p min = 0, it is easy to see that condition (ii) in Theorem 12 will be satisfied. Thus the simpler pricing model (15) can be used instead of model (9) in solving the game. In this case, Theorem 12 can be viewed as a rigorous justification for the validity of the pricing models discussed in their papers.
The reduced model mentioned in Theorem 12 is much simpler than the model in Theorem 11, and is not simply a special case (I i = N i for all i = 1, . . . , M ) of the model discussed in Theorem 11. The model (15) does not involve complementarity constraints of other players while the model (14) does. Such a further simplification is made possible only when ALL sellers' pricing constraints satisfy the hypothesis (ii), and products by different sellers are mutually substitutable, i.e. condition (i). We notice that, even if the condition (ii) is satisfied, it may not be possible to reduce the game (9) to the game (15) if condition (i) is not satisfied, i.e. if seller i's products are not assumed substitutable for seller k's products, ∀ i = k. The following example shows that an equilibrium for the game (15) need not be an equilibrium for the game (9), even for pricing games with very simple constraint sets, namely
Example 6 Suppose there are 2 sellers in the market, model (12) is considered, seller 1 produces products 1 and 2, q 1 = (q 1 ; q 2 ), and seller 2 produces product 3, q
The cost functions facing the sellers are c 1 (q 1 ) = 0q 1 + 5q 2 and c 2 (q 2 ) = 0q 3 . In addition, let
It is easy to show that the matrix A is a P-matrix and condition (ii) in Theorem 12 is satisfied. Hence, in general, a GNE of the game (15) need not be a GNE of the game (9).
For the case where there is only one company (M = 1), we can present a more specific relationship between (9) and (15). For convenience, we omit the index for company. We rewrite the models (9) and (15) for this case as follows: (iii) The models (17) and (18) have the same optimal objective values.
Proof. Let v 1 and v 2 be the optimal objective values of (17) and (18) 
If 
Combining (19) and (20), we have v 1 = v 2 and (iii) is proven. Since the equality holds in (19) and (20), x * is optimal to problem (18) and (p, p * ) is optimal to problem (17). Thus we have proven (i) and (ii).
Note that in the above theorem, there are no specific conditions on the relationship between the demand for product i and the price of product j (j = i). Hence, the products may be substitutes or complements for each other.
In what follows, we will illustrate some cases where simplifications of the NCP constrained pricing models are possible.
Example 7 Consider the case of a single seller and let G := { p 1 ≥ p 2 }. The model (17) is detailed as In the first diagram, all the nonnegative prices p satisfying p ∈ G \ Ω, are mapped to the line segments AB and BC, thus B(p) ∈ G. Also, for all p ∈ Ω ∩ G, we have
The model (17) can thus be reduced to the model (18) as follows:
From the second diagram in Figure 5 , we can see that all the nonnegative prices p, with p ∈ G \ Ω, are mapped to the line segment AC. It is clear that the segment AB (excluding B) does not lie in G. That is, there exists prices likep, wherep ∈ G but B(p) / ∈ G. In this case, the problem (17) cannot be reduced to the problem (18). However, the complementarity constraints in the problem (17) can be partially eliminated by virtue of Theorem 11. Indeed, for all nonnegative p ∈ G, p 1 ≥ p 2 ≥ B 2 (p) (as p ≥ B(p) always holds). Thus, the condition 'p ∈ G implies (p 1 , B 2 (p)) ∈ G' is satisfied and the problem (17) can be simplified to the model (14) as follows:
In this subsection, we have exhibited some possible simplifications like (14), (15) and (18) of the NCP constrained model (9). Indeed, it may be possible to uncover other tractable models via simplifications of the NCP constrained model (9). However, we wish to emphasize that the use of any simplified model requires rigorous justifications, and such justifications are now made possible by virtue of the fundamental and complete NCP constrained pricing model (9).
Existence of GNE for the pricing games
The issue of existence of equilibrium prices has been discussed for different types of pricing games. Up to now, it remains as a difficult problem. We will review the relevant results for the various pricing games in the next section.
Our pricing model (9) has significant advantages for theoretical analysis such as the equilibrium existence, because it can be reduced to simple games in many circumstances, e.g., to the simple game (15).
Indeed, as an immediate consequence of Theorem 12, the existence of equilibrium prices of the pricing game (9) is guaranteed if the simplified game (15) can be shown to have equilibria. The existence of equilibrium for the simplified game (15) is a classical problem and there are abundant results on it. The conditions for existence for any game depends largely on the emphasis placed on different aspects of the game. We do not attempt to make a complete list of them here. Instead, we will just cite a classical result in Ponstein (1966) to demonstrate the existence of GNE of our pricing model (9).
First, we need some definitions. Let S be the joint feasible region of the players in a game. The feasible region
) of player i's best response problem is said to be a marginal feasible region of S if G i (p
The point to set mapping T S , which maps p ∈ S onto a set T S (p) ⊆ S is said to be lower semicontinuous if, given any p 0 ∈ S and any open set X such that X T S (p 0 ) is not empty, a δ > 0 can be found such that X T S (p) is also not empty for all p ∈ S satisfying | p − p 0 | < δ. As shown in Ponstein (1966) , if S is a convex polyhedron, then T S is lower semicontinuous.
For clarity, we state the following theorem as given in Ponstein (1966) , according to the notations used in our paper.
Theorem 14 Let S be a closed, bounded and convex subset of R N and T S be a lower semicontinuous mapping. For each
Based on this theorem, we have the following existence result for our pricing game.
Theorem 15 
Then there exists a GNE for the game (9).
Proof. By Ponstein (1966) (i.e., the previous theorem), given the conditions on f i , S, T S ∩ Ω , Ω in this theorem, and due to the closed property of Ω, there exists a solution to the game (15). According to Theorem 12, this GNE is also a GNE of the game (9).
The pricing game (10) (or (12) as incorporated with the NCP demand function) is a frequently adopted pricing model. We consider a simple version of the model (assuming
Now we apply Theorem 15 to it, leading us to the following existence theorem. 
) is concave and monotonically decreasing;
Then a GNE for the game (21) exists.
Proof. Firstly, suppose that for any (
). This implies that the feasible region of the problem described by relation (11) is larger at (
Thus the hypotheses of Theorem 15 are satisfied and there exists a GNE for the game (21).
Although the existence proofs of equilibrium prices for the pricing games (9) and (21) are merely simple consequences of Theorem 12 and a classical existence result like Theorem 14, the result is itself significant because the existence of equilibrium prices for any realistic pricing games is, in general, a very difficult issue. A notable advantage of our pricing model (9) is its fundamental simplicity -although it may appear complicated.
Note that our intention in this section is to demonstrate the significance of results like Theorem 12. Thus for simplicity of exposition, we only consider the simple game (21). However, one can consider pricing games that are more general than (21), and apply known existence results other than Theorem 14.
A general review of pricing models
In this paper we propose a new pricing model. In order to see if this new model makes contributions to the existing literature in terms of theory and practice, we would like to make a review of relevant aspects of various pricing models.
A general (static) pricing model is as follows: All sellers simultaneously maximize their profits via the problem
To simplify the exposition, let us consider the simplest profit function
). One can see that the structure of It is generally observed that the demand for a product is insensitive to price changes when prices of products in the market are sufficiently high (the demand may, e.g., vanish or be close to zero at such high prices). Thus, we can divide the set of admissible prices R N + into two areas, a main area where products' demands are sensitive to prices, and the area of other prices to which demands are insensitive. In our model, Ω is the main area. Although, for general markets, the boundary of the main area may not be as clearly and quantitatively defined as Ω, it is a common feature that the demand is sensitive to prices on a certain (usually bounded) area and insensitive on the other. This observation has two implications: (i) the demand-price relation behaves essentially distinctly on the main piece and on several pieces outside the main piece; thus in order to accurately approximate the real demands the functions must be piecewise in nature; and (ii) a demand function must accurately approximate demand and thus may be complicated on the main area, while having a simple structure outside the main area. For example, it may be a constant (perhaps zero) on some pieces. Based on the above observation, an accurate approach to construct a demand function is to approximate the demand separately on several pieces, each with a certain elementary function. In practice, however, building piecewise functions of high dimension (many products) is not easy, because such functions consist of a large number of pieces and for each piece, one must determine its domain and shape. In what follows we consider three possible ways of doing this.
(i) Ignore those prices which are not in the main piece or ignore those products whose demands are zero in the optimal solution or equilibrium. We have seen that, in many circumstances, ignoring alternative prices outside the main piece can lead to inferior strategies and the loss of profit incurred is not negligible. Thus, a pricing model must consider all alternative prices on the entire R N + , unless the restriction on the main piece can be fully justified, for example, as in the situations shown in Theorem 12. Ignoring products whose demands are zero is even less practical. Although the demand of a product vanishes, its price can still affect other products' prices and demands. Thus, leaving out a product can change the whole system and cannot be simply done. Furthermore, a pricing model considers a variety of situations and periods. A product's demand may vanish in some circumstances, but be nonzero in others. An important feature of a pricing model of multiple products is that it allows us to include many alternative products and is able to strategically select products to be produced/sold in various circumstances.
(ii) Design special (elementary) functions to approximate demands on R N + in a single piece. Great efforts have been made in this direction and there have been several functions proposed, such as (Logit) (iii) If we wish to accurately approximate various demand-price relations in real markets, yet still to be able to build practically tractable functions efficiently, the only possibility is to find a scheme which can design piecewise elementary functions in a unified way. In this paper we have presented an approach to construct demand functions and pricing models using NCP, which is a unified scheme to determine functions on all pieces. This scheme can effectively build high-dimensional functions using the rich, well-known NCP structures. Such a unified scheme is realized by exploring the special simple structure of demand outside the main piece. Now let us consider theoretical aspects. We will discuss the existence of NE of pricing games as an example. Traditionally, the existence of NE of a game is proved using certain fixed point theorems. Such theorems typically require the set of best responses to be convex, see e.g. Ponstein (1966) , Harker (1991) or Pang and Fukushima (2005) . However, we have not found any realistic pricing game (i.e., incorporating realistic demand functions defined on the whole space) that can satisfy such a convexity condition. Thus, to the best of our knowledge, no existence of NE for such pricing games have been proved until new approachs based on supermodularity was proposed, cf. Topkis (1979) and Milgrom and Roberts (1990) . Besides other conditions, their theorems require the demand functions to be supermodular (or log-supermodular) and the feasible sets to be sublattices of R N or complete lattices. Some well-known demand functions, including the aforementioned Logit, Cobb-Douglas, CES demand functions, are log-supermodular. Thus, in a simple single product per seller market, their existence theorems are applicable to these pricing games if, among other conditions, there are only interval constraints on individual prices. Many games, however, involve sellers offering multiple products each, with prices restricted to convex constraint sets. But most convex sets are not complete lattices; nor are they sublattices of R N . Furthermore, it can be difficult for the best response functions of sellers (offering multiple products) to satisfy some form of supermodularity condition.
The existence of GNE of our pricing game is proved through a different approach and under different conditions (see Theorems 15 and 16). We require the objective function to be concave only on the main piece Ω. Our condition on the admissible set of prices corresponds to commonly used feasible sets like convex sets, instead of complete or sublattices. Actually, the proof of GNE existence of our pricing game is remarkably simple. It is achieved by virtue of the NCP structure, which enable us to reduce a pricing game with complementarity constraints to a pricing game with feasible set Ω (Theorem 12). We then apply classical results (see for example Ponstein (1966) ) to the latter game, merely assuming some standard conditions on the demand functions and the strategy sets. Although our GNE existence results may be valid for only certain pricing games involving relatively simple constraints, many cases that cannot be dealt with using the existing theory are already covered by our results.
To summarize, the demand function and pricing model we study in this paper, promise a genuine alternative to existing ones due to their novel special structures. This demand function possesses a piecewise structure which enables us to approximate real market demand in high accuracy. These piecewise smooth demand functions are defined via an NCP, which provides a unified scheme for effective computation and analysis. A fundamental advantage of the pricing models built on such demand functions is demonstrated by Theorem 12 which dramatically simplifies a large number of pricing game instances, resulting in not only computational efficiency but also new theoretical perspectives which lead to, e.g. a simple equilibrium existence proof under relatively weak conditions.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have formally constructed a model of piecewise smooth demand functions for a market of multiple products, using a nonlinear complementarity problem (NCP). Based on this, we introduced an NCP constrained best response pricing problem for each seller involved in a pricing game. Some properties of our demand and pricing models were presented. In particular, we have shown that our demand function is monotone. Under certain conditions, we have also shown that the complementarity constrained pricing model can be simplified by eliminating the complementarity constraints. Such a simplification is also possible for many other optimization problems and games involving our model of demand functions. We wish to mention that any simplification must be rigorously justified using a fundamental complete model. Our pricing model (9) gives a concrete realization of this principle. On the other hand, there are also many instances in which such simplifications can lead to wrong models, as shown by some of the examples we have presented. In these situations, the NCP constraints inherited from the demand functions are unavoidable and remain as a core structure in the models.
The analysis of this model remains as a challenge to researchers. Here we will mention some future research directions:
-The theoretical analysis, e.g., existence and uniqueness, of Nash Equilibria for games involving our pricing models with complementarity constraints.
-The search for new ways in which NCP constrained decision-making models may be simplified to forms which yield more insight and are more tractable.
-The study of stochastic demand models. Our deterministic demand model can be the backbone of many realistic, stochastic demand models.
-The investigation of applications of demand functions is a rich area for researchers and practitioners. The pricing models and their properties studied in this paper are merely simple examples in this direction.
-As a special example of an MPEC, cf. Luo, Pang and Ralph (1996) , the NCP constrained pricing model presented in this paper may be solved by methods specifically tailored for it. New theory and algorithms that exploit the special structure of the model may be developed.
